A formal treatment of conceptualization is essential and a fundamental aspect of knowledge representation, Ontologies and information engineering. Several approaches have been proposed based on extensional logic and extensional reduction model. However, in this paper we highlight several limitations of their applicability for modelling conceptualizations in dynamic and open environments, due to several strong assumptions that are not adequate for dynamic and open environments. To this end we argue that intension based model is a natural and adequate model. We present a model based on the theory of Properties Relations and Propositions. This description takes the concepts and relations as primitives and, as such, irreducible. The proposed description is then extended to describe the world in more details by capturing the properties of the domain concepts.
INTRODUCTION
Ontology is a very active topic in the knowledge formalization, information sharing, and artificial intelligence communities. The progress in artificial intelligence, knowledge engineering, the semantic web, information sharing, information integration and P2P systems made the development of ontologies essential for information systems. Especially in dynamic systems and open environment, ontology plays a very important role in facilitating the interaction and collaboration between several agents. Ontology specifies a conceptualization which is essential for the formalization of knowledge (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987) . A conceptualization is defined as "an abstract model that consists of the relevant concepts and the conceptual relations that exist in a certain domain" (Xue, 2010) . This definition emphasizes the intensional nature of a conceptualization. (Gruber, 1993 ) defined a conceptualization as "the objects, concepts, and other entities that are presumed to exist in some area of interest and the relations that hold amongst them" (Gruber, 1993) . This definition reflects the extensional account of the conceptualization described in (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987) . (Guarino, Oberle and Staab, 2009) argued that a conceptualization is about concepts.
And as such, the conceptualization should not change unless the meanings do change (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) . And so, (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) defined a conceptualization as "an intensional semantic structure that encodes the implicit roles constraining the structure of a piece of reality". This definition also shows that conceptualization is of an intensional nature. As will be shown later, extensional logic cannot describe intensional contexts. And this is why an intensional notation is required for the task of describing a conceptualization.
An extensional reduction notation for describing a conceptualization is proposed (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) , (Guarino, 1998) , and (Guarino et al., 2009 ). This model followed the possible world approach (Anderson, 1984) for intensional logic. The extensional reduction model is more adequate than the extensional model as it deals with conceptual relations as opposed to extensional relations in the extensional model. There are, however, several formal and intuitive concerns about the possible world approach that reduces the intensional entities to extensional ones (Bealer, 1993) , (Bealer, 1998a) . It is also noticed that extensional reduction model is appropriate for describing systems in which the set of existing entities is not allowed to change while the relations between them may change. However, the extensional reduction model does not adequately describe information systems or dynamic systems in which new entities are allowed to enter and/or leave the world. It also describes the domain in terms of extensional entities rather than concepts. The extensional reduction notation also treats the concepts as relations, which is found to be inappropriate and unintuitive. For these reason the need for an intensional-based notation for describing a conceptualization arises.
In this work, two different approaches for describing a conceptualization are discussed and analyzed. These approaches are fundamentally different as they belong to different classes of logic. The PRP theory (Bealer, 1979) for intensional logic is then discussed. An intensional model for the conceptualization, based on the PRP theory, is proposed. This intensional model avoids the limitations of the extensional and the extensional reduction notations. The proposed notation is also extended to support a more fine-grained description of a conceptualization in which the properties of the domain concepts are captured.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly explains the assumptions, applicability, and limitations of the extensional logic and the intensional logic. Section 3 then discusses the extensional model for a conceptualization. Then, Section 4 describes the extensional reduction notation that is based on the possible world approach. The critical points in these two approaches are discussed in section 5 which sheds some light on the PRP theory (Bealer, 1997) and proposes the intensional model for the conceptualization. In the same section, both coursegrained and fine-grained intensional-based descriptions for the conceptualization are proposed. Finally, section 6 concludes the work.
EXTENSIONAL LOGIC AND INTENSIONAL LOGIC
This section explains briefly the extensional logic and the intensional logic as applied to modelling a conceptualization. We will start by a simple example (Fitting, 2007) (Fitting, 2007) . One of the major differences that help distinguishing between the intensional and extensional contexts is the applicability of substitutivity (Bealer, 1982) . In other words, a context in which substitutivity does not apply can be recognized as an intensional context. However, for extensional contexts, the substitutivity of equivalents always holds. The following argument (Bealer 1982) explains the failure of the principle of substitutivity in the intensional contexts.
x believes that everything runs. Everything runs if and only if everything walks. .'. x believes that everything walks It is obvious that the above argument is intuitively invalid. This is because the substitutivity is used in an intensional context in which it does not apply. Sentences like; "It is known that…", "It is believed that …", "It is said that…", "It is necessary that…" are typical intensional contexts (Fitting, 2007) . For a computer scientist, expressing the belief of an agent or the knowledge of an information system follows the same role. That is why the belief of an agent and the knowledge of an information system are intensional matters.
Intensional systems are those in which intensional features can be represented (Fitting, 2007) . These are the systems that cannot be described in extensional logic. In order to describe such systems, several theories for intensional entities were proposed. Some of these theories included some reduction and some others adopted a nonreductionist view. Those theories, which incorporated reduction, reduce the intensional entities to extensional entities (Bealer, 1998 ). An example of such category of theories is the possible world approach (Anderson, 1984) and (Lewis, 1986) .
When used for describing a conceptualization, the reductionist approaches assume that the world has fixed set of entities. As such, these approaches are applicable if one is interested in describing a static system with a fixed set of entities in which the relations between objects are allowed to change. These approaches, however, are not adequate for describing information systems or dynamic systems in which entities or agents can enter and/or leave the system at any time.
The non-reductionist approaches, however, take the intensional entities such as concepts, relations, and properties, at face-values, i.e. as real irreducible entities. An example of theories of this category is the theory of Properties, Relations, and Propositions (Bealer, 1997) , (Bealer, 1982) , and (Bealer, 1983) . Modelling the conceptualization using this class of logic is more adequate for dynamic systems and open environment. It allows for the description of intensional contexts such as belief and knowledge. It also accounts for changes in the world as long the concepts and the meanings do not change.
EXTENSIONAL MODEL
The extensional model is based on the extensional logic. And as such it describes the conceptualization in terms of declarative sentences and ordinary relations. According to this model, a conceptualization is formally defined as a triple E e = (D e , F e , R e ) consisting of a universe of discourse, a functional basis set for that universe, a relational basis set (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987) . The universe of discourse D e is a set of all entities, or what is called extensions, in the domain. A function maps an entity e i D e to another entity e j D e based on an interrelation between the two entities. The set of functions that are emphasized in the conceptualization is referred to as the functional basis set F e . And finally, the relational basis set R e is the set of all extensional relations that hold between the elements of D e .
The following example (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987) explains the extensional model of conceptualization: Consider the blocks world that has only one concept (block). And consider a specific instance of this world in which there are five blocks arranged as shown in Figure 1 . (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987) .
In this example, it is assumed that there is only one function in this domain that is relevant to the conceptualization. This function is called Hat, and it maps each item to its hat (the item that lies directly above it). It is also assumed that there are four different relations that are relevant to this conceptualization. These relations are On, Above, Clear, and 
clear 1 = {a, d}, and table= {c, e}.
In the previous example, the extensions, in the snapshot of the blocks world shown in Figure 1 , were described using the extensional notation. It should be noticed, however, that the extensional logic cannot describe intensional matters. And this is because extensional logic substitutes equivalent entities based on their extensions. And this does not apply for intensional contexts.
EXTENSIONAL REDUCTION MODEL
The fact that "an agent, or an information system, for simplicity, believes something about the world" cannot, adequately, be described using extensional logic. This is because it is an intensional context. And as such, describing such contexts using extensional logic might result in unintuitive arguments. (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) also pointed out that "the extensional notation of conceptualization is only useful if one is interested in an isolated snapshot of the world". For instance, if a different arrangement of blocks is considered, as shown in Figure  2 , the corresponding conceptualization, according to the extensional notation, will be different. (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) .
It is argued (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) , (Guarino, 1998) and (Guarino et al., 2009 ) that, the conceptualization should focus on the meaning instead of a particular state of the world. And so, the conceptualization should not change when the arrangement of the blocks, in the blocks world, changes. In order to capture such intuition, the possible world theory (Anderson, 1984 ) is adopted as a basis for describing the conceptualization (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) , (Guarino, 1998) , and (Guarino et al., 2009 ). This theory reduces the intensional entities to extensional entities, i.e. extensional functions or sets (Bealer, 1998) .
Using the possible world reduction, (Guarino and Giaretta, 1995) formally described the conceptualization as a triple E er = (D er , W er , R er ) (Guarino et al., 2009 ). In this model, D er is a domain of objects, W er is a set of possible worlds, and R er is a set of conceptual relations. According to this model, a conceptual relation of arity n on D er is a function from the set of possible world W er to the set 2 of all possible n-ary relations on D er . It is also worth mentioning that, in this model the concepts are treated as relations, or functions, from W er to 2 (Guarino et al., 2009 ).
Referring to the blocks world example shown in Figure 1 , the conceptualization for the blocks world based on the extensional reduction model is Here it is noticed that D e1 =D e2 , however, R e1 ≠R e2 , and in turn E e1 ≠E e2 . On the other hand, the configuration in Figure 2 , described using the extensional reduction model, is E er2 = (D er2 , W er2 , R er2 ). And based on the possible world reduction, it can be shown that D er1 =D er2 . This is obvious since the entities in the world have not changed, i.e. the five blocks in both Figure 1 and Figure 2 . Since W er is the set of all possible configurations of the elements of D er , and since D er1 =D er2 , it can also be shown that W er1 = W er2 . And finally since R er is a set of relations from W er to 2 . It is also obvious that, R er1 and R er2 are equivalent. And in turns, E er1 = E er2 as one would expect.
INTENSIONAL MODEL
It is clear that the extensional reduction, or the possible world approach, is more expressive as compared to the extensional model. As discussed in the previous section, different arrangements of the same entities will not result in different conceptualization. This is because the meanings of the relations between them do not change. However, for several reasons, this model needs to be further revisited, especially in the context of knowledge formalization, information systems, information integration, and open environments.
There are several formal and intuitive concerns about the possible world reduction (Bealer, 1993) , (Bealer, 1998a) . First and foremost is that, it is a reduction that reduces the intensional entities to extensional entities. Further discussions about the possible world reduction can also be found in (Adams, 1974) and (Jubien, 1988) (as cited in Bealer, 1993) . Bealer proposed a non-reductionist formulation for intensional logic that is compatible with actualism as opposed to possibilism. The theory of Properties Relations and Propositions (Bealer, 1997) and (Bealer, 1982) , and (Bealer, 1993) takes properties, relations and propositions as real irreducible intensional entities.
Before the formal description is proposed, some important definitions will be discussed first. We will start with the definition of a concept. "Cognitive scientists generally agree that a concept is a mental representation that picks out a set of entities, or a category. That is, concepts refer, and what they refer to are categories" (Medin and Rips, 2005) . In other words, the term concept denotes a general, abstract, idea of a category. A particular, is a concrete entity that exists in space and time as opposed to a concept. This does not mean that every instance of a category is exactly the same. But, only that from some perspective they are treated equivalently based on something they have in common. The relation between a concept and particular will be referred to as abstraction. So a concept is created by keeping the characteristics that are common between several particulars while abstracting away the characteristics that are uncommon.
A conceptualization is also defined as an abstract model that consists of the relevant concepts and the conceptual relations that exist in a certain domain (Xue, 2010) . Again this definition emphasizes the fact that the conceptualization is about concepts and meanings. And so, the conceptualization should remain the same even when the state of the world is changed or a particular is introduced to the world. This assumes that the new particular that is introduced to the system is an extension of a concept that is already captured in the conceptualization. It is only the introduction of a new concept or conceptual relation that should result in different conceptualization. In order for this point to be clear, Figure 3 shows another example of the blocks world in which another block f is introduced to the world. Let us assume that the conceptualization for the configuration shown in Figure 3 , based on the extensional model, is E e3 . As discussed before, it is quite evident that E e1 , E e2 , and E e3 are different. This is partially taken care of in the extensional reduction model that is based on the possible world approach. The conceptualization for the configuration in Figure 3 , based on the extensional reduction model, will be referred to as Since the extensional reduction model is based on the possible world reduction, the so called conceptual relations are, in fact, extensional relations between the set of possible worlds and the set of extensions in the domain. It is also clear that, the introduction of a new extension to the world changes the conceptualization. According to the intensional model, introducing a new particular, which corresponds to a concept that is already captured in the system, should not change the conceptualization.
Based on the above discussion, an intensional model that accounts for the instantiation, or extensionalization, is required. Being an intensional model, it should take the relations as intensional entities rather than reducing them to extensional functions. The intensional model should also capture the concepts (based on the observation of the particulars) instead of capturing the particulars themselves. Especially in the context of information systems, inserting a record in the database, for instance, can be considered as sort of instantiation. And this should not affect the conceptualization.
It is also worth mentioning that, the extensional reduction model treats the concepts as relations and mixes them with the set of relations. We find this inappropriate and unintuitive for the purpose of this work. This is because, the concepts are abstractions of entities that exist in certain time and space while the relations are abstractions of the interrelations between these entities. Even though both concepts and relations are intensional entities, they are different in nature.
Another observation is that, the relations in the possible world approach are separated from the domain. And even though this is not wrong for describing the conceptualization, we adopt the view that the relations are intensional entities and should be taken as primitive, irreducible, entities (Bealer, 1997) and (Bealer, 1982) . And as such, it is more adequate to treat the intensional relations as part of the domain. In that sense, both the set of concepts and the set of conceptual relations will be members of the domain.
Finally, it is also important that the model can be expanded in order to describe the world in more details. An example of this would be a model that describes the properties of the concepts as will be shown later.
Motivated by the above observations, a new intensional model for describing the conceptualization is proposed. This model is based on Bealer's intensional logic (Bealer, 1997) (Bealer, 1983) . The following section will shed some light on Bealer's intensional logic. Then the proposed model will be explained. The proposed model will then be extended to describe the properties assigned to the concepts.
Intensional Algebra
This section briefly explains the Intensional Algebraic structure according to the theory of Properties Relations and Propositions for intensional logic (Bealer, 1979) . For more details about the theory of PRP, we refer the reader to (Bealer, 1979) (Bealer, 1982) , (Bealer, 1983) . The theory of PRP is a non-reductionist intensional formalization for intensional logic. This formalization takes the properties, the relations, and the propositions as real irreducible entities instead of reducing them to extensional entities. According to the theory of PRP, an intensional algebra is a structure (D, J, K) consisting of a domain D, a set of logical operations J, and a set of possible extensionalization functions K (Bealer, 1979) and (Bealer, 1998b) . The domain D divides into subdomains that include the intensional entities of the domain. The set of logical operations includes, but not limited to, conjunction, negation, singular predication, existential generalization, and so on. And the possible extensionalization functions assign extensions to relevant items in the domain. Extensionalization can be defined as the process of keeping the abstraction distinct and maintaining the relationship between the abstractions and observed facts (Aparaso, 2010) . In other words, extensionalization is the connection between reality and the conception of the observer.
Intensional Description of Conceptualization
As mentioned earlier, the conceptualization is defined as abstract model that consists of the relevant concepts and relations that exist in certain domain (Xue, 2010) . This definition will be revised as "an abstraction that consists of the relevant concepts and relations that exist in certain domain". We purposely take off the word model from the definition because it might imply the use of formal language, or the lead to the illusion of being something physical. In order to intensionally describe conceptualization, an intensional structure, based on the theory of PRP, is used. This structure is formally explained below and various advantages of the new model are discussed. According to the intensional notation, a conceptualization, is described as a tuple E i = (D, K) in which D is a domain and K is a set of extensionalization functions. The domain D, in turns, consists of the set of concepts C and the set of conceptual relations R, written as D= (C, R). The set of concepts C captures abstracts to all relevant entities in the world. And the set of relations R can be further decomposed into binary relations R 2 , ternary relations R 3 , and so on. The members of the set of extensionalization functions K assign entities of the reality to the corresponding concepts and conceptual relations in the conceptualization. Figure  4 explains how an extensionalization function relates elements of the reality to both concepts and intensional relations in the conceptualization. Figure 4 shows how the particulars are related to the conceptualization through the extensionalization function. Note that, the predicate Sit (Cat, Mat) does not describe certain instances of the concepts Cat or Mat. Rather it intensionally means that entities corresponding to the concept Cat can be described as Sitting on any entity that can be referred to as a Mat. And as such the conceptualization corresponding to the world in Figure 4 can be described as Were extensions of new relations introduced to the world? If yes, then:
i. Are these intensional relations relevant to our conceptualization? By looking at Figure 5 ; the answer to the first question is YES. This is because another cat is now sitting on the mat. However, since the concept that is already captured in E i4 , this should not change the conceptualization. This is because the introduction of a new cat does not change the meaning of the concept cat. Now let us examine the relations between relevant concepts in Figure 5 . There seem to be a relation between the two cats, as one of them is beside the other. Now, if this relation is relevant to our conceptualization, this will be perceived as a binary relation on the concept Cat, i.e. SidebySide (Cat, Cat) . However, if this relation is irrelevant to our conceptualization, it will be abstracted out and the conceptualization Ei4 will be able to describe the Cat/Mat world in Figure 5 . And as such, our conceptualization captures the facts that, there can be cats, and there can be mats, and cats can sit on mats. No matter how many cats, how many mats, and how many cats are sitting on mats, this should not affect the conceptualization. By examining Figure 6 and trying to answer the same questions above, one can observe that the world has changed. This change adds both an extension of a new concept, Dog, and extensions of new conceptual relations, i.e. SidebySide (Dog, Cat) and Sit (Dog, Mat). The next question would be, is the concept Dog relevant to our conceptualization? If the answer is No, then the concept Dog will be abstracted out and the conceptualization won't be affected. However, if the concept Dog is relevant to our conceptualization then the conceptualization should change in order to account for that new concept. In a similar way, we will need to answer the question about the conceptual relations and whether or not they are relevant to our conceptualization.
Advantages of the Intensional Model
As discussed earlier, the extensional reduction model is more appropriate for describing the conceptualization as compared to the extensional model. The extensional reduction model, however, is suitable for describing static systems in which the configuration of the system may change, without introducing new entities. For the sake of describing information systems, or dynamic system that exist in open environment, the extensional reduction model may not be a good candidate. For this reason and for several reasons, mentioned above, the need for an intensional-based model is quite evident. The intensional model has further improved the description of conceptualization so that it describes the relations as real irreducible entities instead of reducing them to extensional functions. It also deals with concepts rather than extensional entities or objects. Moreover, the intensional relation separates the concepts from the relations as they are different in nature. This is different from the extensional reduction model which treats the concepts as relations. Furthermore, since the intensional model treats the intensional relations as primitive entities, they are considered to be part of the domain. It is also worth mentioning that the use of the singular term in the intensional logic (Bealer, 1987) avoids higher order syntax for intensional logic (Majkic, 2009) . And finally, the proposed intensional description of conceptualization is easy to expand so that it describes more details about the world. In the next section, it will be shown how the intensional model will be expanded to describe the properties of the domain concepts.
Fine Grained Description
Recall in section 5.2, the intensional model of conceptualization describes the conceptualization as a tuple (D i , K i ). In this description, D is composed of subdomains containing both the concepts C, and the conceptual relations R. This model can further be extended to describe not only the relations between concepts, but also the properties of the concepts. A particular instance of a property is referred to as an abstract particular or a trope (Bacon, 2008) . Following the PRP theory (Bealer, 1997) and (Bealer, 1998) , the properties are taken as primitive entities and considered as part of the domain. The values assigned to the properties can be thought of as concepts. However these concepts are not of direct relevance to the conceptualization. And as such, these concepts are going to be called extrinsic concepts Ce. On the other hands, the concepts that are of direct relevance to the domain will be referred to as intrinsic concepts C i .
The expanded model of the conceptualization is defined as a tuple E i = (D i , K i ). In this model, the domain consists of four members D i = (C i , C e , R, P). These four members represent intrinsic concepts, extrinsic concepts, relations, and properties. An example of a property in Figure 4 would be the color of the cat. Assuming that a Cat can have one of several colors (Black, White, Grey, or Brown) , these colors are considered extrinsic concepts in our conceptualization. The fact that cats can have the grey color will be described by the property Color (Cat, Grey). This should not be confused with asserting certain fact about a certain entity in the world. However, this should be understood as an intensional property that can be read as "extensions of the concept Cat can be attributed as having a Grey Color".
As shown in this section, the intensional deception of conceptualization can be expanded. This allows scalability and gives more control on the description of a system. The ability to expand the intensional description is used here to describe the properties of the domain concepts. However, we expect this property to offer flexibility in describing even more details about the system.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, extensional and extensional reduction models for describing a conceptualization are critically discussed and analysed. It was shown that, while the extensional description is suitable for describing a certain state of the world, the extensional reduction description is appropriate for describing a static world. For information systems, multi-agent systems, and in general, any dynamic system in which entities can enter and leave the system, it is shown that there is a need for an intensional description of the conceptualization. An intensional model for describing a conceptualization is proposed. This model is based on the PRP theory for intensional logic. The advantages of the intensional description are discussed. And, both course-grained and fine-grained descriptions for the conceptualization are provided.
